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Urban Displacements of the Human.

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Published: April 2018

@ Cubic Journal
Design Economy
Design Social
Design Making

@ www.cubicjournal.org
editors@cubicjournal.org

How to Cite - APA

How to Cite - Chicago

DOI 10.31182/cubic.2018.1.007
WWW http://www.cubicjournal.org/wp/

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Designing Space for the Majority: Urban Displacements of the Human.

AbdouMaliq Simone

Social, historical and architectural research on urbanization processes in the Global South have increasingly valorized the contributions of an “urban majority” — a heuristic composite of working poor, working and lower middle class residents — to the formation of intricate repertoires of built forms, economic practices, infrastructures of affect, and collective sensibilities. Despite oscillating registers of structural violence, colonial residue, geopolitical instability, and systematic dispossession, metropolitan landscapes of the South are replete with an incessantly recalibrated intensity of working with and through uncertainty to deliver ways of life that skirt precarity. The auto-construction of the majority is usually associated with particular forms and practices. If the territories of operation usually associated with this urban majority may find themselves increasingly hemmed in by countervailing forces, is it possible to imagine new forms through which the “archives” of their capacities might be expressed? By intervening into the increasingly formatted, homogenized venues of residential and commercial space, it is possible to conceive new possibilities of the ways in which “majority life” can be re-enacted, but in a manner that strategically modulates the very ways in which that life is made visible.
Introduction: The Inhuman Majority

Just as notions of the urban are being extended across multiple spatial and temporal formations, so too are the modes of divergent inhabitation no longer contained by or cohered within the once predominant figuration of the human as “anthropos.” For the bracketing of cities as the embodiment, performance, and culmination of urbanisation processes, while maintaining the façade of distinctive jurisdictions, is subject to intensive porosities and fragmentation. Cities exhibit a protracted history as differentiation machines, constellating the “proper name” of their normative inhabitant “the human” as an entity prohibitive of being anything else than what it is. In other words, not something potentially intertwined with various ecologies and life-worlds as a facet rather than the central player (Colebrook, 2015; Wagner, 2011).

The city existed as the locus through which certain inhabitants could reflect on their being as a singular prerogative untranslatable across other modalities of existence; the formation of a “we” unrelated to anything but itself, yet inscribed as the node whose interests and aspirations were to be concretised through enclosure and the expropriation of critical metabolic relations (Cohen, 2012; 2016). The capacity to reflect and manage the recursive intersections of materials, space, and bodies required inscriptions of gradation that specify various levels of capacity and right, designate who was to be considered human or not as the means to capture the volume of labour sufficient to monumentalise the centration of human form, and to constitute the living embodiment of property and freedom (Ruddick, 2015). The capacity of the human to operate according to the maximisation of its position required a notion of free will, of the ability to act freely amongst otherwise constraining interdependencies, and this necessitated relegating certain bodies to the status of property, capable of circulating only through the transactional circuits of economic exchange and valuation.

In the colonial urban, the outlines of the “modern city” took shape against a backdrop of appropriable and disposable labour whose self-reproduction was largely the responsibility of labour itself (King, 1976; McFarlane, 2008). Populations were frequently expelled, not recognised or accorded limited and provisional rights. Whereas post-colonial states often sought to extend a broad range of public affordances to urban residents of varying backgrounds and statuses, the impetus of modernisation and the incursions of on-going imperialism largely left the majority of residents of postcolonial cities in a prolonged state of political limbo and underdevelopment (Betts and Ross, 1985; Legg 2007, 2008). All phases of colonial rule did experience substantial resistance on the part of urban majorities, and this resistance was multifaceted in terms of the explicitness of the demands and the organisational vehicles deployed to win spaces of operation (Kipfer, 2007). Resistance was never simply a claim for inclusion into the prevailing ideological frameworks or administrative disposition of urban life. The subjected, assumed to be largely incapable of concretising multiple collective imaginations, largely operated in the interstices between sheer survival, intensive surveillance and indifference to generate provisional, always mutating forms of urban life not consonant to its hegemonic forms (Scott, 2005; McKittrick, 2013).

These were concretised throughout long processes of “auto-construction.” Here the density availed by urbanisation means not just packing in a lot of things into a limited space. Rather, it is the creation of a particular kind of space where people, with their devices, resources, tools, imaginations, and techniques, are always acting on each other, pushing and pulling, folding in and leaving out, making use of whatever others are doing, paying
attention to all that is going on, fighting and collaborating. Metropolitan systems throughout much of Latin America, Africa and Asia gave rise to the elaboration of “majority” or “popular districts” that largely served as an interstices between the modern city of cadastres, grids, contractual employment, zoning, and sectorial, demarcated institutions and the zones of temporary, makeshift, and largely impoverished residence. While folding in aspects of each kind of territory, such majority districts were not simply hybrids, but staging areas for a multiplicity of agendas, operations, social compositions, and aspirations. (Holston, 2008; Perlman, 2010; Vasuvedan, 2015; Caldeira, 2016; Minuchin, 2016; Vinay and Maringanti, 2016).

Processes of auto-construction depended upon intricate ways of allocating land and opportunities, working out divisions of labour and complementary efforts, and enabling individuals to experiment with their own singular ways of doing things but in concert with others. Thus, governance institutions were built as distributed across differential relationships and spaces, rather than located in specific offices, bureaus, sectors, territories or functions. In other words, “institutions” existed, but in a dispersed rather than centralised form; institutional functions existed within and across a landscape of relationships of residents as they actively parcelled and settled land, elaborated provisioning systems, and attempted to insert themselves in the flows of materials, food, skills, and money (Benjamin, 2008; Lindell, 2008; Bayat, 2010; Anwar, 2014; Simone, 2014; Perera, 2015).

Such distributed agency did not obviate the consolidation of metropolitan and national institutions endeavouring to exert administrative and political control over these districts. Yet as largely interstitial territories—between divergent logics of accumulation and consolidation—they became a critical arena through which states attempted to configure particular practices of governing (McQuarrie, et al., 2013). Rather than the state developing as an abstract, clearly delineated entity separate from the realities experienced by the majority of residents, states had to “find their feet” operating through engagements with various ways of doing things that did not fall squarely within their purview or within legal frameworks (Singerman, 2009; Roy, 2011; Ghernter, 2014; Boudreau and Davis, 2016). In order for states to attain some traction and legitimacy within the accumulation and management practices of the urban popular, they often had to operate through a wide range of so-called “informal” logics and practices. As Davis (2016) points out the authority of the state does not always coincide with its interests and, as such, informality becomes the locus that attempts to mediate the tensions that ensue when these two aspects of the state conflict. More significantly, the very shaping of the state – its rules, policies, operational procedures – are largely contingent upon how it addresses and operates through the multiple trajectories of self-evolution that have characterised the elaboration of majority districts.

**Interfacing disarticulation**

At the same time, as metropolitan systems become increasingly articulated to a wide range of production networks, commodity chains, and circuits of investment and consumption those systems then come to exist for and through an oscillating matrix of relations that revalue existent processes of livelihood formation, labouring, and production (Mezzandra and Neilson 2015, Dory 2016). As these relationships are characterised by competition, increasing standardisation and the exigency of distinctiveness, modes of provisioning are transformed, as well as the particular ways specific lives and practices are valued. Enhanced articulation of metropolitan systems to a larger world entails the disarticulation of
specific places, bodies, and ways of doing things that are increasingly devalued or reified as the embodiments of that, which needs to be rectified, or is beyond redemption. But rather than being simply cast off, the anachronistic or improper is maintained as a form of incarceration or, more significantly as the occasion to generate new enclosures and privileges and constitute new urban identities, while, at the same time, creating a shadow world where primitive accumulations can accrue unimpeded, or to which inefficacies can be attributed (Blair and Werner, 2011; Berndt, 2013; Bear, 2015).

While these zones of marginalisation mostly consisted of what are conventionally known as slums or informal shack settlements, majority districts were not immune from the crossfires of articulating and disarticulating forces. As interstitial places they exuded a wide range of countervailing tendencies. Different trajectories of agglomeration and parcelling, reinvestment and accommodation to decline, constant incremental improvements and acts of doing nothing, trends toward accumulation and consolidation, as well as letting things disperse and dissipate, locally induced conversions of land and buildings and external appropriation of them—all of these inclinations existed next to each other, and where it was not always clear what differences were at stake (see the essays in Graham and McFarlane, 2014; Lepawsky, et al., 2015).

Sometimes these majority districts completely self-evolved through the incremental efforts of residents, and the infrastructural articulations to the large bulk systems were also self-generated. At times states would acquire land, lay down basic infrastructure and housing and then this was altered and remade by successive generations of residents. Often infrastructural articulations were patchy, in constant need of repair. Sanitation usually relied upon septic tanks, and power and water often had to be supplemented with generators and tankers. Sometimes there were collective elements in the production of local space, yet the incremental, piecemeal development and valuation usually lacked systematic coordination, and was more often private than collectively implemented. Nevertheless, there were marked interdependencies of cooperation, parasitism, growth, and implosion—a sense of tied fates—so that across all types of majority districts, if the “plug was pulled” on one, others were likely to follow in a trajectory of gradual decline. Importantly, such districts exuded the aesthetic appearance of planning without necessarily being planned. Here, plotted land distribution, according to specific local practices and logics, acted as the materialised mediation of multiple regulatory regimes.

Managing interfaces with a growing modern city and growing settlements of the urban poor required constant tending, as these districts were subject to various incursions from “both sides”, and their endurance was largely predicated on how to fold in various facets and resources generated by both the modern city and settlements of the poor (Chattopadhyay, 2006). Given the locational advantages that these districts had within the urban core and near periphery, as well as their capacity to generate a heterogeneity of economic activities and a density of multiple household compositions, they constituted an important resource to be domesticated, expropriated, and straightened out by modernist and base political impetuses. They posed potential dangers as breeding grounds for contestation and alternate forms of political authority and legitimacy. As the compositions of their built and social environments made them difficult to read according to the techniques of engagement proffered by official government regulations, they often seemed overly opaque (Sundaram, 2010; Weinstein, 2013; Vigar, 2014).
In such conditions, “real governance” was often subcontracted out to various types of extra-judicial authority or a local political class was cultivated by availing various favours and money-making opportunities (Elyachar, 2005; Fawaz, 2008; Klink, 2013; Jaglin, 2014). Perhaps more importantly a long-honed capacity of such districts to live in close proximity to the poor and evolve forms of reciprocity and patronage increasingly became the target of political elites so as to drive a wedge between these relationships (Dill, 2009; Datta, 2012; Gago, 2015). States frequently preyed on majority districts’ fear of impoverishment, particularly as industrial and public sectors jobs started disappearing and various types of informal entrepreneurship were increasingly overcrowded. In some cities, ruling political machines stoked various forms of ethnic and religious conflict that upended long traditions of mutual accommodation (Weinstein, 2013). In some cities the proliferation of violence or environmental danger generated mistrust and fears that local assets would be devalued. In various constellations of decline in which different combinations of rent-seeking, maximised ground rent, local insecurities, weakening social ties were at work, residents of majority districts, both volitionally and involuntarily, sought to re-establish themselves in new areas of the city or in the apartment blocks proliferating across most Southern cities (Harms, 2013; Zeiderman, 2016).

With its long history of consolidating the “human” as a self-referential subject of history detached from long-chains of signification that come from the capacity to continuously translate the cognitive and behavioural operations of human life in terms of its interdependencies with other species and materials, the urban finds itself constantly in need of “salvation.” The urban repeatedly calls for intervention; there is always a sense of urgency to address, a series of problems to solve. As a complex ecological machine, the urban, in its intricate interweaving of infrastructure, affect, materials, design, and bodies, nevertheless, enables the detachment of “the resident” as an individuated agency capable of endless improvement (Braun, 2014; Amin, 2015; Szeman, 2015). Regardless of its dependency on archives of tertiary retention (Stiegler, 2009), on technical capacities that are indifferent to the well-being of the organism, and on a cognitive assemblage that distributes capacities of calculation and decision-making beyond the realm of consciousness (Hansen, 2012; Hayles, 2016), the surfeit of arrogance underlying such privileged individuation (of human action and thought) can only decompose into a proliferation of divides and conflicts as such a process of “defacement” intensifies.

**Spatialising Efficacy**

The cruel irony of contemporary urbanisation is that at the very moment that the implications of its histories become more and more visible as irrevocable inscriptions on the earth’s geology, the individuation of the urban resident, the disentanglement of the majority from its relational economies and heterogeneous material environments is accelerated (Read, 2016). The “reassignment” of residency to massive vertical complexes, the consignment of formal employment to short-term contracts and flexible labour, and increased valorisation of circulation and provisional social engagements acts to further individuate urban residents away from thick sociality.

Whereas social media and computation seem to elaborate new modalities of interconnectivity and recognition, these are intrinsically volatile operations demanding continuous updates, professions of sentiment, a display of like and dislikes, and a short-circuiting of memory, and thus a sense of meaning and continuity, that render residents always in state of heightened anxiety (Leszczynski, 2016). Ensnosed as environmental conditions, new forms of reflective
analysis—through sensors and recorders—continuously remake fields of attention and significance (Gabrys, 2014). No longer equipped with the assurance of clear valences and collectively deliberated interpretive schema, individuals are less and less certain as to what factors are important in terms of generating a sense of self-efficacy. What is important to pay attention to or not? What is relevant to my situation or not? These questions are increasingly difficult to answer.

Efficacy seems, then, a matter of not excluding anything, of trying to consider as many variables as possible (Amoore and Piotuhk, 2015). As these efforts overwhelm human cognition—for it is impossible to consider not only the relative weight of particular dynamics or variables on one’s situation, let alone their subsequent distribution curves of cause and effect (MacKenzie, 2015)—the importance of the technical increases, in that decisions can be made for us through algorithmic relations. Inclusions and dismissals then become increasingly arbitrary (Thatcher, et al., 2016). If one need not take specific others into consideration because one has conceded a fundamental inability to know who the other actually is in the larger scheme of things and their relative impact on one’s life, then statements can be issued here and there with little need for verification.

Socialisation in a time without the need for verification, where persons can be objects of impressions and claims that need not be backed up with the weight of consensus or evidence, diminishes the operational space available for urban residents at precisely the moment where the possibilities for circulation are maximised and exigent. Within an urban era where success is contingent upon being at the right place at the right time, and where there are no clear maps or probabilities of where that place and time are located, then circulation is a necessity. It is also important not to be overly committed to particular locations and obligations, as these are impediments to circulation.

If the constitutive architecture of inclusive exclusion and exclusive inclusion—so fundamental to the territorialisation of urban life—become increasingly inoperable in the progressive defacement of human primacy, then what kinds of spatialisation are likely to ensue? If, for example, the vast zones of the urban poor, with their piece-meal and oscillating attachments to the larger metropolitan system, in terms of provisioning of services, citizenship, legality, and institutional participation, are no longer “required” as the living antithesis of that figure of the human, to which urban resources are mobilised in support, are these populations completely expendable?

If the surplus value of urban life—of its recursive and reflexive symbolic infrastructures—is decreasingly contingent on the dispossession of the poor, on the extraction of their contributions by force, by relegating them to a condition of sheer survival, then what? Considering Gautam Bhan’s (2016) notion of “judicialisation”, critical spatial interventions into the city take place via courts acting within their notion of the public interest, which tend to then see poor communities as illegitimate incursions on the public. The rights of these communities can then only be recognised in terms of their vulnerability, and not in terms of any contribution they make or rights they might enjoy as common citizens.

Pacification of struggle and resistance has largely been contingent upon the promise of inclusion, of the distribution of incremental improvements in livelihood, and relegating large numbers of urban residents to the labour-intensive processes of putting food on the table. The city, as a matrix of multiple conduits, pathways, voids, junctures, and blockages (Farias and Blok, 2016), means that every attempt to precisely and comprehensively
segregate the poor from the rest are qualified by both unforeseen porosities and the inability to cut-off access altogether when the poor continue to provide a range of “essential” services. But as labour-intensive provisioning of all kinds diminishes and as impoverishment increases in the contraction of industrial labour and cheap service economies, it is possible to foresee an intensified balkanisation of urban space.

A predominant strategy in addressing the prospects of a more feral urbanisation, of the poor increasingly unchained by labour and moving across the city is scavenging packs, are efforts to resettle the poor in permanent houses at some distance from the urban core and encumbering them with ownership through long term debt. As Bhan (2016) persuasively indicates, this transition from housing to the house results in a substantial contraction of the operational spaces available to the poor. The self-evolved basti residents configured a built environment that facilitated collaborative effort and which also served as a platform on which to launch forays transversally across the larger urban surrounds. They gathered materials, information, and contacts that could be folded back into the on-going development of the settlement.

So, the evictions from these settlements to the small flat in a cheaply constructed vertical complex is just one facet of a multiplicity of devices used to homogenise the individual and collective actions of the poor and standardise their status as political actors (Nuijten, 2013). Coupled with the spread of surveillance technologies and the capacity to target “dangerous circulations,” this shrinkage of social space is intended to immobilise the poor. But in this atrophying of their capacities to compensate for the absence of rights and viable livelihood through configuring conduits of movement across the city, of inserting themselves at key junctures to provide cheap labour and services, to collect waste and unintended materials, what is being cultivated appears to be the intensification of the bodies of the poor as weapons, deployed in increasingly desperate acts (Valayden, 2016).

**Restoring the Majority**

Over the past decades, poor communities adopted many different forms of activism to draw attention to their situations, formed organisations and alliances with professional associations and non-governmental organisations, and registered marked success in improving security of tenure through in situ upgrades, land-sharing, and more judicious compensation packages. They gained specific rights to services and citizenship status. But in most of these instances low-income residents find themselves hedged into disciplinary regimens, inflexible built environments, minimal affordances, long commutes, and shrinking horizons of aspirations. Demonetisation in India, extrajudicial assassinations in Philippines, to generalised criminality in Brazil are some of the many modalities of assaults on the capacity of the poor to operate outside increasingly standardised formats. Additionally, wider chasms have been engineered between low-income and majority residents, diminishing their familiarity with each other and undermining the forging of political alliances.

In some way, upper poor, working, and lower middle class residents are equivalently being corralled into so-called affordable housing in large-scale vertical complexes. In many cities across the South these are becoming the predominant forms of housing for the majority. Yet in these circumstances, the “majority” begins to lose much of its heuristic analytical quality. For I have invoked this term not to point to a clearly established demographic or social entity but rather as a mode of intersection whereby heterogeneous ways of life come together as a composite capable
of collective operations yet maintain differentiated fields of influence and activity. As residents are increasingly individuated in terms of their relationships with other residents of a given space and in terms of their operations within the larger urban system, the notion of a “majority” becomes increasingly meaningless.

Yet, it still may possibly be recouped even under the newly predominant circumstances of mass vertical living. First the development of such mega-complexes proceeds largely in a process of “hit and run.” Often the land on which the complex is built has been acquired through temporary use rights. Units are often sold prior to construction and often on a speculative basis—whereby units are resold before the project is completed to avoid property taxes and where the subsequent buyers are often brokers who then parcel out these properties through various subcontracting arrangements. There are often many ambiguities in terms of what constitutes the unit of property or the definition of the acquired asset. Residents are often informed after the fact that property titles cannot be issued until all of the intended units of the project – such as those still waiting to be built – are sold, given the often opaque legal arrangements between the developer and owner of the land. Sometimes acquisition of an apartment unit does not include guaranteed access to the provision of water and electricity. What ensues is that in some of these complexes, given the plurality of leasing arrangements, entitling, and service contracts, residents pay a different price each month for what are otherwise equivalent units.

As the bulk of the units on offer measure from 36 to 42 square meters, the physical space does not correspond to the size of most of the households that end up acquiring them. In other words, the prevailing imaginary presumes the occupants to be an aspirant young middle class couple with one or two small children who will eventually proceed to move on somewhere else. But as these types of units are rapidly becoming the new norm, it is difficult to foresee where that elsewhere will be. As mortgage systems are often quite limited in many Southern cities, acquisition itself entails broad financial mobilisation. These include complex reciprocal borrowing arrangements among families and affiliates, profits from collectively generated economic activities, savings groups, the diversion and laundering of illicitly obtained money, advances on rental agreements for other properties, property swaps, or amenities packages for employees. The plurality of finance applied to the acquisition of units also translates in the heterogeneity of residential compositions. Sometimes residents related through various neighbourhood, institutional, or work connections will acquire entire floors in these buildings. While most buildings are prefabricated, limiting the physical adjustments that can be made, floors are indeed remade within these constraints in order to accommodate extended families.

What often ensues is the agglomeration of social differences that not only mirror the compositions of majority districts but also at times exceed them in the pluralities of household compositions at work. Given that the new environments are not contingent upon residents working out a wide range of both everyday residential and economic activities with each other, an atmosphere of anonymity prevails, reinforced by the sheer numbers of residents involved. Yet at the same time, this does not necessarily obviate opportunities for residents to pay attention to each other, to take note of each other and work out the allocation of niche spaces and the recalibration of floors and buildings to accommodate specific clusters of interests and identities. For example, in the rusunami (subsided lower middle income housing development) at Kalibata in Jakarta, one Muslim association acquired and now manages fifteen floors of apartment units in one building, while gay and lesbian residents are concentrated in the building next door. Just how such clustering
is curated is a process that has taken place in less than three years and largely facilitated by the diversity of operative brokerage.

What unites different kinds of residents of these complexes is the tendency for them not to consider this place as a “home,” at least in the sense that is culturally syntonic to what they have known in the past. The stability of home itself, at least in Jakarta, is something that is slowly diminishing as an overarching value in favour of the importance of circulation, of being able to spread out across various provisional affiliations that are no longer locally based. In this way, one could look at these complexes in Jakarta as the mostly “silent” contestations among various kinds of residents and lifestyles (Islamic, LGBT, young professionals, nascent (barely) middle class families, immigrants, sex workers) for control over floors in specific buildings, so segments, clusters emerge. Yet, the densities of living-with ensure circulations of stories, rumours, and information. There are so many variations of people passing through, staying long, coming in and out, that it is never really clear who is who, what is what.

In this way such vertical complexes, as a generic form, act as a means of compression—an arena that has no particular definition, something that can show up in various formats without contradiction, that does not to be realised empirically according to specific criteria, but which engenders a sense of being-in-concert. Here, many different trajectories and futures are compressed in a generic form that does not allow a definitive sense of the differentiation of its components, where many different ways of doing things are at work, but where it is not possible to clearly distinguish amongst them. As such, new forms of opacity are generated that may enable residents to conduct a wide range of lives under the radar.

The trajectories of external movement engaged by residents cut across a wide range of territories and institutions in Jakarta—evidence of which then loops back to the complex, that can be “mined” by others. These contexts are less the curating of an “inside” than a collective penetration and cultivation of a “larger surrounds.” It is here that the notion of a “majority” might remain salient under new conditions and forms. From whatsapp groups formed on the basis of a wide range of historically shared experiences, such as having had the same fifth grade class or having worked at the same factory a decade ago, to short-lived thematic support groups, to those arbitrarily formed on-line or through chance meeting in restaurants, residents zoom in and out of various associational experiences without having specific agendas or interests to articulate or defend. The seemingly faceless and massive landscapes of vertical residence constituting new peripheries of the urban make up a database. Who uses it and how remain critical political questions.
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DOI: 10.31182/cubic.2018.1.007

CUBIC JOURNAL 2018